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Humanity's Law: Rule of Law for the 
New Global Politicst 
Ruti G. Teitelt 
This Article proposes that international law is undergoing a paradigm 
shift, which will have significant implications for foreign affairs. A dramatic 
expansion of legal machinery, institutions, and processes is occurring in the 
international sphere. Now, more than ever before foreign policy decision-mak-
ing occurs in the shadow of the law. The conception of a new rule of law is at 
stake; appropriate to the present state of global politics, as it aims to manage 
heightened political conflict and violence through law. The impact of the jurid-
ical paradigm shift is primarily discursive. The expanded legal discourse rep-
resented by the present international human rights system contributes a 
rhetoric that both enables and constrains politics; but whose constructive 
potential is not infinitely malleable. Understan~ing this paradigm shift 
requires new interpretive principles, which is the larger project for which this 
Article lays the foundation. 
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Introduction 
Serious human rights crises persist despite recent democratization and 
progress in international human rights law. This contradictory state sug-
gests that a puzzle exists concerning international law's relation to politics. 
Indeed, it suggests that the international legal and political orders are out 
of sync. This Article begins by exploring the gap between the apparent 
normative progress and political realities and aims to clarify law's role in 
international politics. 
Existing theory does not adequately account for international law's 
bearing upon international affairs in contemporary political circum-
stances. In fact, the prevailing theorizing in the international realm, which 
tends to be highly schematized between realist and idealist views, evi-
dences the separation between legal and political regimes. Realist termi-
nology explains the fitful course of human rights in the late twentieth-
century as a matter of political will. This position does not adequately 
clarify the present direction in international law and politics, which 
although democratizing implies persistent disorder and violence. This 
inadequacy is due in part to the fact that realist lines tend to evaluate for-
eign affairs as driven exclusively by political circumstances. 1 Similarly, 
idealist views are often inapt to grasp international law's transformed role 
in global politics because they tend to privilege formalist and increasingly 
obsolete conceptions of international law.2 
There needs to be a move beyond these existing international relations 
models because, in light of contemporary changes in law and politics, their 
theoretical structures cannot adequately account for present foreign poli-
cymaking. A better understanding of the present international legal sys-
tem's role in contemporary global politics is urgently needed.3 This Article 
argues that an expanded international legal regime structures foreign poli-
cymaking and lies at the core of global politics' current transformation. 
The expanded juridical discourse penetrates foreign policy realms in new 
1. On realism, see John]. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institu-
tions, 19 lNT'L SECURITY 5, 7 (1994). On the relevance of method and interpretive 
approaches to international law, see Symposium on Method in International Law, 93 AM. 
]. lNT'L L. 291 (1999); Tom]. Farer, Human Rights in Law's Empire: The jurisprudence 
War, 85 AM.]. lNT'L L. 117 (1991); Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and 
World Politics, 54 lNT'L 0RG. 385, 391 (2000) (discussing realism); David Kennedy, The 
Disciplines of International Law and Policy, 12 LEIDEN]. lNT'L. L. 9, 106 (1999) (discuss-
ing convergence of international relations and legal internationalism). 
2. See Farer, supra note 1. 
3. See generally DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS 
AND CULTURE (1999) (discussing the globalization debate and drawing attention to the 
dangers of eliding globalization with concepts such as interdependence, integration, uni-
versalism, and convergence). 
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ways. Its dominant conception of the rule of law is based on the "humani-
tarian" regime, which is an expanded version of what is traditionally called 
the "law of war. "4 For the most part, the enhanced role of the- humanita-
rian regime in contemporary politics is not yet adequately understood, 
because it is to some extent still in its infancy and thus lacks a thoroughgo-
ing jurisprudence,5 particularly with respect to the rights dimensions in 
the expanded law of war. 
This Article takes the first steps in the project of interpreting the newly 
expanded international legal regime by elucidating the significance of 
adopting an expanded juridical discourse. Further, this Article aims to 
clarify the relevance of international law within the changing constitution 
of the globalizing world order. Recent developments in humanitarian law 
guide contemporary global politics by structuring international rule of 
law's policymaking with respect to the heightened disorder associated with 
end-of-century political transformation. This new international legalism-
or "humanity's law" -assists in framing and legitimating the form of poli-
cymaking choices in present global politics. 
The new humanitarianism is the rule of law that emerged from a 
world of contradictory political conditions. As a rule of law, it compre-
hends the dimensions of democratization, political fragmentation, and dis-
order's coexistence.6 The fall of the Soviet Union and the related rise of 
U.S. power,7 as well as post-Soviet transitions and other recent political and 
social transformations, form the context for the paradigm shift now occur-
ring in international law.8 Political, economic, and technological changes 
have had globalizing ramifications that penetrated state borders in ways 
that transformed the core rule of law values in the international legal order 
and created a shift away from the previously prevailing state-centric sys-
tem. These globalization processes have numerous ramifications for the 
structure of a simultaneously expanding and disaggregating international 
4. See THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW CoMES OF AGE (1998) [hereinafter WAR 
CRIMES]; Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM.]. INT'L. L. 239 
(2000). On the dimension of human rights in international law, see MYRES S. McDou-
GAL &: W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUB-
LIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY 148-53, 941-62 (1981). 
5. See Ruti Teitel, Human Rights Genealogy, 66 FoRDHAM L. REv. 301 (1997). 
6. See HELD ET AL., supra note 3; LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: TOWARDS 
CONSOLIDATION (1999); KEN jOWITT, NEW WORLD DISORDER: THE LENINIST EXTINCTION 
(1994) (discussing the political destabilization that occurred as a consequence of the 
collapse of communism). 
7. See LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY: POLITICAL MORALITY IN A ONE-SUPER-
POWER WORLD (1994) (focusing on American international hegemony and arguing that 
the "legitimacy of international hegemony should be evaluated in the same way as the 
legitimacy of other authoritative political structures, particularly domestic 
governments"). 
8. See SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 92 (1998) (referring to an 
"unbundling of sovereignty"); Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, EcoNOMIST, Sept. 
18, 1999, at 49; Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 foREIGN AFF. 183, 
183-84 (1997) (arguing that "the State is not disappearing, it is disaggregating into its 
separate, functionally distinct parts"); see also Peter]. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 
70 U. Cow. L. REv. 1223 (1999) (discussing disaggregation of the federal regime). 
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legal system and have significant consequences for the rule of law.9 
The present international political context is more democratic10 yet 
also less stable, because increasing political fragmentation creates poten-
tial for political violence. 11 Though perhaps paradoxical, the new democ-
ratization is largely associated with the post-Cold War transformations, a 
time when political violence profoundly increased and a host of inade-
quately consolidated transitional regimes appeared. 12 This new political 
reality challenges prevailing assumptions regarding the comparative roles 
of dictatorships and democracies in maintaining the peace. 13 Recognition 
of the prevailing political conditions of increased violence clarifies the con-
temporary turn to a dominant conception of global rule of law in terms of 
an enlarged law of war. 
The primary change in the international legal regime is that humanita-
rian law has expanded and has a greater reach. Its expanded legal rhetoric 
reflects changing conceptions of legitimacy in contemporary international 
politics and represents a paradigm shift between divergent conceptions of 
the rule of law in the international domain. 14 Understanding the signifi-
cance of the greater juridicization of international affairs discourse 
requires new interpretive principles, which this Article begins to lay forth. 
In order to do so, this Article explores the relationship between the 
contemporary international law regime and foreign affairs. Part I 
introduces the new rule of law and examines the dynamic interaction 
between the emerging humanitarian law regime and the rapidly changing 
political conditions of global politics. Part II analyzes the role of the new 
international legalism in foreign affairs. Subsequently, Part Ill focuses on 
the effects of merging the two legal regimes. Finally, Part IV addresses the 
role of the legal scheme in globalizing politics, specifically its redefinition 
of security in international politics. 
9. See SASSEN supra note 8, at 92; Slaughter, supra note 8, at 183-84; Spiro, supra 
note 8, at 1223. 
10. Democracy has grown chiefly in terms of open elections. See generally HELD ET 
AL., supra note 3; LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: TOWARDS CONSOLIDATION 
(1999). 
11. See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT (David Wippman ed., 
1998) (discussing the contemporary proliferation of ethnic conflict). Recognition of the 
increase in world violence was made abundantly clear by the post-September 11 escala-
tion in global terrorism. See Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 55/ 
158, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 55th Sess., Agenda Item 164, at 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/ 
158 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/55/a55rl58.pdf Qan. 
30, 2001) (defining global terrorism); see also Jamie F. Metz!, Information Intervention; 
When Switching Channels Isn't Enough, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 15 (1997); Farced Zakaria, The 
Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 foREIGN AFF. 22 (1997). Many of these political condi-
tions existed since the Soviet collapse. See jowITT, supra note 6. 
12. See generally JowITT, supra note 6 (discussing political destabilization following 
the communist collapse). 
13. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE·(Lewis White Beck ed., 1957); 
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999); MICHAEL DOYLE, Kant, Lib-
eral Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL &: Pua. AFF. 205, 225 n.23 (1983). 
14. For elaboration see infra text accompanying notes 157-72. 
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I. Global Rule of Law 
This Article contends that the most pronounced change in the interna-
tional legal system is the dramatic expansion of humanitarian law's reach 
through its merger with international human rights law15 and its attendant 
implications for global rule of law.16 Accordingly, this Part examines 
changes in international law that have had the greatest impact on the con-
temporary transformation of international relations and maintains that the 
changing legal regime reconceives the structure, subject and core animating 
values of the international system. 17 The legal change that is now occur-
ring at international, regional and domestic levels is coalescing to form a 
body of law that elaborates upon changing conceptions of rule of law val-
ues, state responsibilities and human rights in a transforming interna-
tional system.18 The new global rule of law challenges the international 
legal system's prevailing bases and values in a number of ways. 
In the emerging regime, humanitarian law's scope has expanded expo-
nentially. This remarkable transformation amounts to a paradigm shift 
because it levels the threshold conditions that determine whether an inter-
national or national legal regime applies to a given situation. The new 
humanitarian regime implies change along several dimensions resulting in 
a discourse with a new reach, a jurisdiction with an extended scope, a 
reconceptualized personality, and a new institutionalization. These ele-
ments are elaborated upon below. 
15. See generally HuMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL POLITICS (Tim Dunne & Nicholas ]. 
Wheeler eds., 1999); LoUJs HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990). 
16. For a comprehensive exposition of the contemporary law of war, see generally 
WAR CRIMES, supra note 4. 
17. This argument is distinguishable from constructivist arguments. This Article 
argues that the law plays a constitutive role in contemporary politics, but it does not 
advocate the constructivist view that these uses necessarily imply expression of determi-
nate values of justice. Indeed, the argument elaborated in my previous work is more 
limited and pragmatic. See Ru ti Teitel, Transitional jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Polit-
ical Transformation, 106 YALE L.]. 2009 (1997) (arguing that in periods of political 
change the law can be used to play multiple roles, both constraining and enabling). For 
a useful discussion of distinctions between the approaches of constructivism and prag-
matism, see Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Principles and Pragmatism in Strategies of 
International Justice, Presented to the Olin Institute's National Security Seminar at 
Harvard University (Dec. 2001) (unpublished paper on file with author). For a discus-
sion of constructivism, see MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
SocIETY 2-3 (1996); Martha Finnemore, Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Interven-
tion, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS 
(Peter]. Katzenstein ed., 1996); THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND 
DOMESTIC CHANGE 7-8, 236, 270- 73 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999) (using an 
approach that generally draws on social constructivism); see also ALEXANDER WENDT, 
SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999) (developing a theory of the interna-
tional system as a social construction). 
18. For illustrations of these developments see Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, Annex 11, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 183/9, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) available at http://www.un.org/law/ 
icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter ICC Statute] (explicitly referring to and incorporat-
ing national law, as well as explicating its role in spurring contemporary changes in 
national law). '" 
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A. A Discourse with a New Reach 
In the new humanitarianism, the normative apparatus of the law of 
war, particularly its criminal justice dimension, is expanding beyond its 
historic role. International jurisdiction's demonstrable extension is occur-
ring across the dimensions of time and space, and is redefining political 
time and boundaries. Historically, international criminal processes were 
deployed ex post, or after the peace. However, in the contemporary 
moment the law of war is being invoked ex ante, or before war, coming in 
much earlier in foreign policy deliberations and at times even in lieu of 
military intervention. t9 
First, "humanity's law" extends humanitarian law in terms of political 
time because it evokes the discourse of justice earlier in policymaking 
processes and thus changes the rule of law's role in international politics. 
Historically "justice talk" was entirely ex post. International adjudicatory 
processes were deployed following international armed conflicts prompted 
by state violations of international law, and were used to retroactively 
rationalize infringement on state sovereignty.2° Currently, however the 
humanitarian regime comes in much earlier in policy debates, particularly 
in deliberations regarding intervention in human rights crises.21 For 
example, early introduction of humanitarian law occurred in the delibera-
tions concerning the appropriate international response to the Balkans 
conflict.22 This apparent expansion in international humanitarian regime 
gives "justice talk" a bigger role in contemporary foreign policymaking. 
Second, the new humanitarian regime creates a spatial transformation 
by expanding the humanitarian regime's jurisdiction in terms of territorial-
ity that extends across national borders. Historically, the law of war 
applied in times of international conflict. In contrast, it is now more gener-
ally applied and extends to situations of internal political conflict. Con-
temporary humanitarian law reaches well beyond the parameters of 
19. See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NuREMBERG TRIALS (1992); Ruti 
Teitel, Nuremberg and its Legacy: Fifty Years Later, in WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF NUREM-
BERG 44 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999). Compare the Allied intervention in World War II 
and the post-World War II Nuremberg Trials with the basis of international community 
involvement in Rwanda. In the latter case, the international community relied upon 
U.N. Charter, Chapter Vil, not for authorization to intervene militarily, but first to place 
U.N. observers in the country and subsequently to establish the war crimes tribunal 
once the conflict subsided. See Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of 
the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 54 Sess. U.N. 
Doc. S/1999/1257 (1999), available at http://www.un.org/News/ossg/ 
rwanda_report.htm [hereinafter Rwanda Report]; Implications of International Response 
to Events in Rwanda, Kosovo Examined by Secretary-General, in Address to General Assem-
bly, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th mtg. (AM), U.N. Press Release GA/9595 (1999) (provid-
ing highlights of the Secretary-General's opening address to the General Assembly). 
20. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 19; WAR CRIMES, supra note 4 (offering a com-
prehensive historical account); Teitel, supra note 5. 
21. See Ruti G. Teitel, Bringing the Messiah through the Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PouT-
ICAL TRANSITION: GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 177-93 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999). 
22. See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text. 
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international armed conflict to regulate persecution internal to states,23 as 
evidenced in the new treaties, charters, and ad hoc tribunals. 24 This juris-
dictional expansion is further evidenced in the International Criminal 
Court's Charter, which redefines offenses by dropping the previously 
required nexus to international armed conflict and extending "interna-
tional jurisdiction" to situations internal to states. 2s The present shift to 
an expanded humanitarian law that is generally applicable with or without 
international conflict reveals the extent to which the law of war has moved 
from international law's periphery to its core. The expanding law of war 
challenges the basic category of international human rights law by redefin-
ing the threshold conditions of war and peace;26 this expanded jurisdiction 
implies humanitarian law's normalization. As this Article further elabo-
rates below, humanitarian law assists in controlling some of the illiberal 
dimensions of contemporary political transitions, thus redefining the sense 
of global rule of law. 
B. A jurisdiction with an Extended Scope 
Changes in the substantive values of the international legal system are 
related to the jurisdictional changes discussed above. The longstanding 
statist model has been associated with a concomitant understanding of 
international rule of law that defined security on the basis of existing 
national borders. Indeed, in the traditional state-centric system the very 
basis for human rights was tied to state borders and the principle of nation-
ality. 27 This longstanding perception is now giving way to an alternative 
23. See ICC Statute, supra note 18, at arts. 11-19 (setting out the Court's jurisdic-
tion); see also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
31 (incorporating, for the first time, "armed conflict not of an international character" 
into the lexicon of the Law of War) [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Statute of the 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/25704, 
Annex (1993), as amended by S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 
(1998), reprinted in 32 ILM 1192 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the Inter-
national Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994) [hereinafter !CTR Statute]. 
The Rwanda precedent makes this clear as the offences only relate to internal conflict. 
For discussion of some of these developments, see Theodor Meron, International 
Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM.]. INT'L. L. 554, 554-55 (1995) (noting that 
despite some states' efforts "to limit the reach of international law applicable to non-
international armed conflicts, the criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda have contributed significantly to the development of international humanitarian 
law and its extension to non-international armed conflicts"). The first case prosecuted 
by the ICTY dealt with this issue. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment 
in Sentencing Appeals, reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 635 (ICTY App. Chamber, Jan. 26, 2000). 
24. See ICC Statute, supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
25. Id. 
26. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 1. 
27. In the traditional nation-state regime, the protection of individual human rights 
was connected to nationality. See HENRY ]. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 93-94, 1251-52 (2d ed. Oxford 
2000). 
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view of the meaning of global order, as evidenced in the present expansion 
of the treaty regime defining the law of war.28 
The merger between humanitarian law and human rights law gives 
rise to a complicated and somewhat contradictory legal regime that chal-
lenges the very basis of longstanding notions of international rule of law. 
Whereas international rule of law was defined in terms relating to state 
sovereignty and self-determination, there is now a shift to a juridical defini-
tion of the state and an alternative discourse framed in the universalizing 
language of human rights. 29 
C. A Reconceptualized Personality 
Transformations in the new legal regime's subject transcend changes 
relating to its values and jurisdictional parameters. The traditional state-
centered view of personality predicated on the view of the state as the rele-
vant subject of the international regime,30 has numerous implications for 
the meaning of international rule of law, such as the understanding of 
equality and reciprocity as the cardinal rule of law principles governing 
international relations.31 Consequentially, the protection of territorial sov-
ereignty traditionally defined the international rule of law.32 
In contrast, the new paradigm weds traditional humanitarianism with 
the law of human rights, causing a shift away from states33 as the domi-
nant subjects of international law to include "persons"34 and "peoples."35 
28. See infra notes 40-44; see also INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 
(2000), available at http://www.kosovocommission.org/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2002). 
29. For a discussion of human rights as a language, see Kathryn Sikkink, Activists 
Beyond Borders, in MARGARET E. KECK &: KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: 
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 211 (1997); NEIL MACCORMICK, QUES-
TIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH 175, 
177-78, 180-81 (1999); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of 
Liberal States, 6 EuR.]. INT't L. 503, 505, 537 (1996) (discussing the role of judicial 
discourse). 
30. See D. P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (2d ed. 1970); STARKE's INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 85 (I. A. Shearer ed., 11th ed. 1994) (arguing that states are the principal 
subjects of international law); see also ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND How WE UsE IT 39 (1994) (discussing the classic view that interna-
tional law applies to states, and arguing that there is growing perception that 
international law is relevant to international actors other than states). 
31. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2( 4); see generally J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 1 (4th ed. 1949). 
32. The central principles of state sovereignty are legal equality in relation to other 
states and the right to be free from the use of force against its territorial integrity. See 
Ruti Teitel, National Sovereignty, 3 LEGAL AFF. 26-27 (2002). 
33. See infra text accompanying note 58; GLOBAL LAw WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther 
Teubner ed., 1997). 
34. See generally A.H. Robertson, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, in ETUDES ET 
EssAIS SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL HuMANITAIRE ET SUR LES PRINCIPES DE LA CROIX-ROUGE/ 
STUDIES [STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCI-
PLES IN HONOR OF jEAN PICTET] 793 (C. Swinarski ed., 1984) (discussing the historical 
protections accorded to individuals under international humanitarian law); THOMAS M. 
FRANCK, THE EMPOWERED SELF: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM (1999) 
(discussing the contemporary treatment of individuals in international law). 
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A tiered subjectivity comes into relief in the extended legal personality of 
the expanded humanitarian regime. The nation-state is rio longer the sole 
subject of international law because the new regime is also potentially 
applicable to groups and persons. These developments in the transforming 
juridical discourse reflect the paradigm shift now underway in the concep-
tualization of international rule of law. This new subjectivity is evident in 
the heightened enforcement of the expanded norms, which are directed 
beyond states to persons and peoples.36 These new enforcement structures 
are elaborated upon below. 
D. A New Institutionalization 
Finally, another dimension of the juridical transformation is its 
enforcement and entrenchment through international institutionalization. 
The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed a remarkable expansion 
in the institutionalization of international law.37 These new institutions, 
which range from the international courts to nongovernmental organiza-
tions,38 mediate both public and private realms. 
Currently, the humanitarian regime is being entrenched through 
codifications chartering new international judicial institutions that make 
criminal justice the primary means of enforcing international rights law.39 
Although international criminal tribunals began on an ad hoc basis, they 
have become the international community's primary response to humani-
tarian crises. A consensus on establishing a new institution dedicated to 
ongoing international adjudication of violations of humanitarian law40 is 
seen in the convening of the ad hoc tribunals regarding the Balkans and 
Rwanda,41 leading to the recent establishment of a permanent Interna-
tional Criminal Court. Consequently, there is now a turn to an expanded 
discourse of international criminal justice.42 The charters that form bases 
of the new international tribunals complicate traditional understandings of 
35. For a discussion of "peoples," see jOHN RAWLS, THE LAW Of PEOPLES (1999); 
Slaughter, supra note 8, at 183-84 (discussing disaggregation in globalizing politics). 
36. On the merger of international humanitarian law and human rights law, see ICC 
Statute, supra note 18, at art. 7 (defining "crimes against humanity" and proscribing 
"persecution against any identifiable group of collectivity on political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender ... grounds" as part of "widespread or systematic 
attack directed against one, civilian population." Id. at (h)); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case 
No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Jurisdiction Appeal (stating that "a state sovereignty 
approach has been gradually supplanted by a human being oriented approach"); LOUIS 
HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 16-17 (1995). 
3 7. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
38. One aspect of these new regulatory' structures involve nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs). For an elaboration of their role, see MARGARET E. KECK &: KATHRYN 
SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
(1997). 
39. See ICC Statute, supra note 18 
40. Id. The ICC Statute became active when sixty ratifications were obtained. There 
are presently eighty-four ratifications and one hundred thirty-nine signatures. See http:/ 
/iccnow.org/countryinfo/worldsigsandratifications:html (last visited Nov. 22, 2002). 
41. See ICTY Statute, supra note 23; ICTR Statute, supra note 23. 
42. See ICC Statute, supra note 18. 
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the law of war, the parameters of war and peace and the state's duties to its 
citizens,43 by extending international jurisdiction beyond national borders 
and situations of conflict to penetrate states during times of peace.44 
The establishment of an international regime that contemplates the 
coercive enforcement of humanitarian law reflects a reconceptualization of 
the rule of law in the international order. The aim of the newly established 
enforcement machinery in the form of independent international institu-
tions dedicated to enforcing humanitarian law supports the perception of a 
heightened international rule of law. These new international institutions 
incorporate criminal sanctions into the international legal system. Crimi-
nal sanctions are a distinctive dimension of legal norms and can plausibly 
be used to signal and reinforce the difference between general and positive 
law norms.45 Moreover, criminal sanctions have distinctive constructive 
potential.46 
Changes concerning the central elements of the expanded humanita-
rian regimes primarily signal a move towards a greater juridicization of 
foreign affairs. This shift illustrates the law's new constructivist poten-
tial.47 A new discourse in the international realm enables the reconceptu-
alization of present international political circumstances, and an attendant 
redirecting of the course of current foreign policy deliberations and policy. 
The constitutive relation of law and politics in international affairs is a 
complex dynamic. At minimum, the new juridical approach allows law to 
reframe and shift the parameters of existing politics. The next Part 
explores some of the implications of international legalism's rise, as well as 
its relation to the politics of globalization. 
43. See Developments in International Criminal Law, 93 AM.]. INT'L L. 1 (1999). 
44. On the challenge to the differentiation of international and internal conflicts, see 
ICC Statute, supra note 18, at art. 7 (concerning jurisdiction for crimes against human-
ity); Tadic decision of 2 October 1995, 9[ 148-134; see also Ruti Teitel, supra note 21, at 
184 (arguing that the ICTY expanded the international criminal jurisdiction first estab-
lished at the Nuremberg Trials to cover "crimes against humanity" even when they occur 
wholly within the state). The !CTR evidences another instance of expansion of interna-
tional criminal jurisdiction which, while an international tribunal, prosecuted solely 
intrastate crimes committed in the Rwandan genocide. See !CTR Statute, supra note 23, 
at art. 4. 
45. See generally H. L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 213-14 (Oxford 1961) (dis-
cussing the uses of sanctions for norm strengthening functions in domestic law); juDITH 
N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS (1986) (discussing legalism as 
an ideology internal to the legal profession and, more importantly for the purposes of 
this Article, as political ideology). Growing emphasis on positivism in international law 
has tended to derive largely from American jurisprudence. See ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL 
POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998); Teitel supra note 17, at 2016-30 (offering 
a comparative perspective to positivism in the rule of law). 
46. To date, there has been little exploration of the distinctive contribution of crimi-
nal law to the constructivist theory of law. On constructivism generally, see supra note 
17 and accompanying text. In particular, the question arises of whether the role of 
coercive sanctions should be accounted for within the context of traditional interna-
tional law premised on consent or within constructivist theory generally premised on 
other techniques of persuasion. This Article attempts to advance this question. See infra 
text accompanying notes 93-100. 
47. For some of the scholars advocating constructivism in the law, see supra note 17 
and accompanying text; see also RuTI G. TEITEL, TRANS!TlONAL JusncE 4-6 (2000). 
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II. The New International Legalism 
The purpose of analyzing the expanded humanitarian legal regime, 
particularly its influence on international affairs, is to provide a better 
understanding of the paradigm shift. Understanding this shift, which is 
caused by the new juridical regime and its influence in the international 
realm, should clarify contemporary changes in international politics. 
A better understanding of changing legal and political realities 
requires new interpretive approaches to international law.48 In the prevail-
ing interpretive approach, international law tends to be externalized and 
thus largely understood as a mere epiphenomenon of international polit-
ics.49 Moreover, theorizing on the law's relation to politics tends to be uni-
directional in that political practices are treated as potential sources of 
norms, but not the other way around.50 
By contrast, the interpretive approach advanced for here is a more 
dynamic, interactive relationship between international law and politics. 
This approach asserts that the emerging legal regime plays a role in shaping 
current political policymaking, chiefly by reframing and restructuring the 
discourse in international affairs in a legalist direction.51 The expanded 
humanitarian regime, operating in the context of its new institutionaliza-
tion, articulates a transformed structure and justificatory process that aim 
to rationalize and legitimate contemporary foreign policy, particularly as it 
relates to globalization. 
To begin, the threshold dimension of the changes in the emerging 
international law regime affect the contemporary humanitarian law devel-
opments by transforming the structure of the international lawmaking 
processes. The emerging humanitarian regime transforms and diversifies 
international lawmaking processes. Classically, the state was the primary 
agency of norm-making in the international system,52 conventional law-
making dominated the international sphere, and international law, 
whether "conventional" or "customary," was defined in terms of state con-
sent and practice.53 Although this characterization is an over simplifica-
tion, the state-centered paradigm is now dated,54 contemporary norm 
making in the international realm is not simply an expression of interstate 
48. These are highly schematic here but will be elaborated on further in a larger 
project in progress. 
49. Moreover, within international affairs the "realist" perspective sees the rule of 
law largely as a function of politics. See supra note 1; see also supra note 41. 
50. On the sources of law, see Statute of the International Court of justice, June 26, 
1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter IC] Statute]. 
51. Some of the ramifications of this structuring of the political discourse are taken 
up infra in Part IV. 
52. See !CJ Statute, supra note 50; see infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
53. Namely, treaties and customary law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980); IC] Statute, 
supra note 50, at art. 38. See generally MARK W. ]ANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNA· 
TIONAL LAW 185 (3d ed. 1999); infra note 57. 
54. See infra note 57. 
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relations.ss In the global context of fragmented power, other agents, 
namely private parties, non-governmental actors and transnational institu-
tions, play a growing role in the production of international law.s6 These 
changes in international lawmaking processes go to the core of the existing 
structure and mechanisms of the international regimes 7 and affect aspects 
of both political and legal sovereignty. Transformation in the sites and 
processes of international lawmaking reflect a shift in the legitimacy and 
authority of international law, with ambivalent ramifications for the new 
international humanitarian regime's transformation. Diversification in the 
sites of international norm making parallels the general economic and 
political expansion outward that characterizes industrialized states.ss As 
such, these changes ultimately redound to the legitimization of globaliza-
tion processes. Indeed, what emerges is an apparently globalized 
jurisprudence. S9 
The advent of a new international legalism signals enhanced legiti-
macy for international law. Historically, international law was commonly 
thought to lack national law's traditional forms of legitimacy; namely the 
authority associated with state sovereignty. In the present globalizing 
order, however there is an evident shift in the sources of international law's 
authority as well as in the perception of its legitimacy.60 The humanitarian 
regime's expanded reach is best understood in relation to the broader phe-
nomenology of globalization, because changes in international law relate 
to the present conditions of global politics. 
55. This is recognized in recent scholarship that emphasizes the growth of transna-
tional law and focuses on the rise in transnational juridification. See Harold Hongju 
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997); KECK & SIK-
KINK, supra note 38; Slaughter, supra note 8 at 183-97. However, this scholarly writing 
does not explicitly address the direction in the expansion of the international regime. 
See Goldstein et al., supra note 1, at 390 (outlining the shift in the role of law in interna-
tional politics, but observing that legal scholars have failed to analyze the larger context 
of legalization). 
56. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 411 (1992); 
FRANCK, supra note 34; Jonathan I. Charney, Transnational Corporations and Developing 
Public International Law, 1983 DuKE Lj. 748 (1983); P. K. Menon, The International 
Personality of Individuals in International Law: A Broadening of the Traditional Doctrine, 1 
]. TRANSNAT'L L. & PoL'Y 151 (1992). For example, the European Convention of Human 
Rights allows individuals to bring complaints. Recent decades have seen dramatic expan-
sion in access by individual claimants. In some fashion, this process allows individuals 
to make international law. See European Commission of Human Rights, Survey of Activ-
ities and Statistics 1991, at 21 (1992). 
57. As traditionally understood international law making consists largely of state 
agreements via treaty lawmaking. See generally HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW 
SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 155-180 (1927);]. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW 
OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF PEACE (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 
1963). 
58. Regarding this phenomenon of globalization see generally supra note 33; HELD 
ET AL., supra note 3; SASSEN, supra note 8. 
59. There is a growing literature on this globalized jurisprudence. See, e.g., WILLIAM 
TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY (William Twining & Christopher McCrud-
den eds., 2000); GLOBAL LAw WITHOUT A STATE, supra note 33; TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
PROCESSES: GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPAR!TlES (Michael Likosky ed., 2002). 
60. For an elaboration, see infra text accompanying notes 69-79. 
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The change in the perception of international law's legitimacy is 
occurring now for several reasons, all of which relate to a number of 
domestic and international developments. First, the enhancement of inter-
national law's authority relates to significant changes in political condi-
tions on the domestic front through the weakening of national institutions. 
This weakening occurs in newly transitional states,61 although the impact 
of the globalization process is also felt in consolidated nation-states.62 The 
international legal system's transformation has evident domestic ramifica-
tions, particularly regarding foreign affairs decision-making processes63 as 
evidenced in a recently invigorated debate in the United States over the 
appropriate role of international law in the American constitutional 
scheme.64 
The international humanitarian regime's enhanced legal potential is 
also attributable to multiple institutional changes on the international 
61. This phenomenon is associated with the most significant change in contempo-
rary political circumstances-the Soviet collapse. On weak nation-states, see Stephen 
Holmes, Can Weak-State Liberalism Survive? Paper presented at New York University 
Colloquium on Constitutional Theory (Spring 1997) (unpublished paper on file with 
author). 
62. An illustration is evident in the case of General Pinochet. See Regina v. Bartle, 2 
W.L.R. 827 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.), reprinted in 2 All E.R. 97 (1999) and 38 I.L.M. 581 
(1999). 
63. A leading precedent in this regard was the extradition of Augusto Pinochet and 
its effects in the international realm and upon domestic decision-making. See Menno T. 
Kamminga, Lessons Learned from the Exercise of Universal jurisdiction in Respect of Gross 
Human Rights Offenses, 23 HuM. RTs. Q. 940 (2001) (discussing the expanding reach of 
universal jurisdiction to adjudicate). See generally Paul W. Kahn, American Hegemony 
and International Law: Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the 
New International Order, 1 CHI.]. INT'L L. 1 (2000). 
64. The question central to this debate is: "To what extent is international law part 
of national law?" See Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary Interna-
tional Law: A Response to Professors Bradley & Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 
376-77 (1997); Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International 
Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FoRDHAM L. REV. 463, 528-29 (1997); Louis 
Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1569 
(1984); see, e.g., Symposium: Foreign Affairs Law at the End of the Century, 70 U. Cow. 
L. REV. 1089 (1999). Compare Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State 
Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) (favoring the existing rule of treating international 
law as federal law) with Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith Customary International 
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. REV. 815 
(1997) (arguing that customary international law should not have the status of federal 
law, in the absence of authorization from the federal political branches); compare Bruce 
Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REv. 799 (1995) 
(arguing for a broad interpretation of the treaty power whereby both the House and the 
Senate may conclude congressional-executive agreements as treaties with a mere major-
ity) with Lawrence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form 
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995) (arguing for a 
narrower view of the sources of proper treaty-making authority). This interpretive 
debate is associated with other related questions, namely about the role of non-executive 
political actors in foreign affairs. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378-79 
(1998); Crosby v. Nat'! Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (denying states the 
power to make their own international human rights policy); Lori Fisler Damrosch, The 
Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" 
Treaties, 67 CHI. KENT L. REv. 515, 532 (1991) (discussing the interpretation and effect 
of non self-executing declarations). 
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front; namely developments in the juridical regime such as the newly 
chartered international legal institutions and related proceedings.65 The 
new humanitarian regime reconceives core international law principles 
regarding sovereignty and personality in the international order, and trans-
forms dimensions of state obligations and individual rights in a globalizing 
politics. The new legal lexicon links the evolving political changes associ-
ated with globalization processes with changing standards relating to the 
protection of humanitarian rights in the international realm. 
Thus, in the transforming legal regime there is a shift in the relevant 
locus of authority from the national to the international and from the state 
to transnational institutions and other political actors implicated in various 
dimensions of globalization processes.66 This demonstrable move to law, 
with or without the state, represents a turn to an alternative source of 
authority, a development that relates to the aims of globalizing politics.67 
A The Rhetoric of justice 
When it is understood in the context of the heightened political disor-
der associated with the last two decades, the turn to humanitarian law and 
legal processes reveals the extent to which international criminal justice 
has become the basis for the now emergent global rule of law.68 The turn 
to humanitarian law represents a move, not only to an increased and 
expanded legalism, but also to a distinctive discourse of justice. 
To begin, a historical vantage point elucidates the extent to which con-
temporary rule of law's meaning in the international realm has become 
more and more coincident with international criminal justice. 69 The 
meaning of international rule of law has evolved over time and reflects the 
accumulation of the use of law to manage conflict. A century's experience 
lays the basis for the use of international criminal justice to legitimate inter-
65. See ICC Statute, supra note 18, at arts. 11-19; see also Geneva Convention I, 
supra note 23; ICTY Statute, supra note 23; !CTR, supra note 23; Meron, supra note 23, at 
554-55 (noting that despite some states' efforts "to limit the reach of international law 
applicable to non-international armed conflicts, the criminal tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda have contributed significantly to the development of interna-
tional humanitarian law and its extension to non-international armed conflicts"). 
66. There is a growing literature on the emergence of relevant actors. See KECK &: 
SIKKINK, supra note 38. 
67. These uses of international justice are analogous to other historical instances of 
the use of law to regulate faraway territories through royal law and colonial law. See 
MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 23 (1981) (noting that 
a major function of courts in many societies is to assist in holding the countryside, 
providing an extraterritorial court to adjust relations among the occupying cadres 
according to their own rules, as well as a body of national law in order to facilitate 
central administration). 
68. See TEITEL, supra 4 7, at 33-39. 
69. As a historical matter, this is exemplified by the emphasis in the Nuremberg 
Tribunals on the prosecution of the arch offenses of "aggression" and the "crime against 
the peace." For an extensive historical account, see TAYLOR, supra note 19; Teitel, supra 
note 19, at 44. 
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national intervention.7° Contemporary humanitarian law is grounded on 
the preexisting scheme of the law of war where the legal precedents of the 
last century and more particularly, the human rights crises of the twentieth 
century,71 continue to guide the emerging humanitarian law regime. 72 
This conventional framework lays the basis for the now transformed rule of 
law reflected in the prevailing international regime.73 
Currently, the humanitarian scheme is being applied to changing 
political circumstances. The core predicates of the postwar regime are 
undergoing a substantial transformation that goes to the basic structure 
and core values of the international legal system. However, these changes 
are hardly self-evident, nor do they comport easily with intuitions about 
the present direction of international law. Therefore, a better understand-
ing of the constitutive interaction of law and politics necessitates the appli-
cation of interpretive principles regarding the historical development of the 
international legal domain. From a positive law perspective, the historical 
law of war has expanded to merge with peacetime human rights law to 
constitute the new humanitarian regime. The evident tension in the back-
ground conditions of international humanitarian law-beyond war to 
peacetime-is definitional, as it moves the boundaries of the law of war 
beyond international armed conflict. In the contemporary moment, the 
humanitarian legal regime reaches beyond the realm of international rela-
tions as historically understood and transcends traditional international 
armed conflict to reach other situations of conflict occurring within the 
nation state. 74 
70. See MICHAEL WALZER, JusT AND UNJUST WARS 51-63 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing 
the legalist paradigm). 
71. See U.N. CHARTER, art. l, para. 7. 
72. See Teitel, supra note 5, at 301-15. Historically, the paradigmatic bases are the 
two predecessor international legal regimes established, first, by the Westphalia treaty 
after the Religious Wars, and then subsequently by the treaties following World War II. 
On the development of the law of war, see also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
THE USE OF FORCE (2000); see generally WAR CRIMES, supra note 4. 
73. See GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAw SINCE 1945 (1994); Geneva Convention I, 
supra note 23; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, 
Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 47, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1948, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 
287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to· 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U .N .T.S. 
1, reprinted in 16 l.L.M. 1391 (1977); Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (1979), reprinted in 16 l.L.M. 1442. 
74. For discussion of this issue in the context of a case challenging the jurisdiction 
of the ICTY, insofar as it extends beyond international armed conflict, see Prosecutor v. 
Tadic Qudgment), Case No. IT-94-I-A, Int'! Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
(App. Chamber, July 15, 1999, 38 l.L.M. 1518 (1999); reprinted in 94 AM.j. INT'L. L. 571 
(2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm; Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-I-
AR12, Jurisdiction Appeal Case (1995) (referring to the distinction between interna-
tional and internal conflict as "more and more blurred, and international legal rules 
have increasingly have been agreed upon to regulate internal armed conflicts"); see also 
WAR CRIMES, supra note 4. 
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The broader significance of this transformation is that the now emerg-
ing rule of law transforms the historical values associated with the long-
standing Westphalia international security arrangement, which is 
primarily understood in terms of the stability of state borders. 75 Moreover, 
the preexisting regime conceived of rights as nationality-based and pro-
tected by the sovereign state. just as the prior international legal regime, 
premised on state sovereignty and self-determination, was associated with 
the growth of modern nationalism, 76 the new legal developments of the 
emergent humanitarian law regime are associated with the contemporary 
phenomena of political transition and globalization. The expanded 
humanitarian legal regime reestablishes the meaning of rule of law in the 
new global politics. Linking international criminal law to the broader pro-
ject of peacemaking, the new codifications transcend ordinary rule of law 
values while giving expression to dynamic norms that reconstruct the rele-
vant understandings of international security. 77 
In the new humanitarianism, rule of law is not solely defined in terms 
of the prevailing statist lexicon of national self-determination and state 
sovereignty. Instead, the new discourse goes to the very core of the prevail-
ing paradigm. The present move shifts the emphasis from the protection of 
state borders or territoriality, which is the core of the established state sys-
tem, to other more juridical dimensions of the state such as the stability of 
peoples. 78 The transformed discourse is appropriate for contemporary 
globalizing politics because it complements the prevailing state-centered 
approach and its attention to the protection of state borders, with an 
approach that is predicated on alternative humanitarian concerns. 
B. The Role of Humanitarian Discourse in the New Global Politics 
Currently, there is a heightened reliance on law, legal processes, and 
judicial structures in international politics, which raises a question about 
how to interpret these judicial developments. The emerging international 
75. Compare R. B.]. Walker & Saul H. Mendlovitz, Interrogating State Sovereignty, in 
CONTENDING SOVEREIGNTIES: REDEFINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY 1 (R. B. ]. Walker & Saul 
H. Mendlovitz eds., 1990) (arguing that states no longer pretend to be autonomous and 
that the most important forces affecting people's lives are global in scale and conse-
quence), with RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT (1999) (contending for transformation in 
the values of state autonomy over time). 
76. See STEPHEN KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 182-83 (1999) (dis-
cussing the link between the rise of nationalism and international legal sovereignty). 
77. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 51, 52, 53 in light of U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4. These 
provisions attempt to reconcile the statist norm of sovereignty with the growing justifica-
tions for international humanitarian intervention. Increasingly, humanitarian interven-
tion is being justified under U.N. Charter, art. 52(l)'s authorization of regional 
"enforcement action." See Louis Henkin, Editorial Comment, NATO's Kosovo Interven-
tion: Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention," 93 AM.]. INT'L. L. 824, 827-28 
(1999) (noting that proponents of a "living Charter" would support an interpretation of 
the law and an adaptation of UN procedures). For critical discussion of the notion of an 
evolving right of humanitarian intervention, see GRAY, supra note 72, at 26-31 (evaluat-
ing the notion of a legal doctrine of humanitarian intervention). 
78. See infra text accompanying notes 120-26 (discussing population permanence). 
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humanitarian legal regime supports a transformation of global politics 
through its articulation of an international discourse of rule of law. 79 Sev-
eral dimensions of this regime are discussed below. Global rule of law 
both enables and restrains power in today's political circumstances in 
order to manage new conditions of political disorder through the rubric of 
law. 
In the absence of a common world government80 or bank,81 it is the 
humanitarian legal regime that is used to lend authority and legitimacy to 
the international realm through its tribunals, proceedings, juridical lan-
guage, and public justificatory processes. Humanitarian law and courts 
are the preeminent institutions and processes aimed at managing present 
global politics and representing the legalist view on how to advance the 
core international rule of law's goal of ending political violence.82 
Greater reliance on the judiciary is both a distinct institutional 
response and an alternative process for resolving international controver-
sies. There are multiple bases for this institutional shift. New humanitari-
anism is the rule of law for contemporary political circumstances of 
heightened political disorder.83 Historically, courts have performed the 
societal function of managing social conflict, particularly concerning the 
governance of far-away territories.84 This managerial role has reemerged 
79. On the role of human rights language, see Ru ti Teitel, The Future of Human Rights 
Discourse, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 449, 454-58 (2002); Ruti Teitel, Millennial Visions: 
Human Rights at Century's End in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PouncAL TRANSITION: GETTYSBURG TO 
BosNIA 339-42 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999); Harold Hongju Koh, Introduc-
tion, U.S. State Dep't, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1999 Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices (released Feb. 25, 2000), available at http:// 
www.state.gov/www I global/human_rights/1999 _hrp_report/ overview.html (referring 
to human rights as one of three "universal languages"). Koh describes this "third global-
ization" as "the rise of transnational human rights networks of both public and private 
actors." Id. at xv; See also KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 38. See generally Louis HENKIN, 
How NATIONS BEHAVE 42-44, 88-90, 93 (2d ed. 1979). On law as language, see gener-
ally James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Com-
munal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 684 (1985) (suggesting that law is most usefully seen as a 
branch of rhetoric and defining rhetoric as "a central art by which community and cul-
ture are established, maintained, and transformed"). 
80. See Andrew Strauss & Richard Falk, For a Global People's Assembly, lNT'L HERALD 
TRIB. (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France), Nov. 14, 1997, OP/ED at 8, available at http:// 
www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/issues/falk.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2002); Richard Falk & 
Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of 
Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN.]. lNT'L L. 191 (2000). 
81. As in unified Europe. See, e.g., Patrick Deller, The European System of Central 
Banks: Quo Vadis?, 21 Hous.J. lNT'L L. 169 (1999);John Linarelli, The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the Post-Cold War Era, 16 U. PA.]. INT'L EcoN. L. 373 
(1995). On other unifying conceptions of Europe, see]. H. H. WEILER, THE CONSTITU-
TION OF EUROPE: Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR? AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EURO-
PEAN INTEGRATION (1999). 
82. See Teitel, supra note 21at177-93 (1999); see generally SHKLAR, supra note 45 
(discussing legalism). 
83. These political circumstances have been characterized as those of "small wars 
and weak states." See jack Straw, Mercenaries: Mad Mike Comes infrom the Cold, ECONO-
MIST, Feb. 14, 2002, at 55; see also supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
84. See HAROLD]. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADITION (1983); KENNETH l. KARST & KEITH S. ROSEN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
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in recent politics.85 The· judiciary's established management functions 
clarify the remarkable resurgence of extraterritorial law and courts associ-
ated with globalization. Once again, as in colonial times, the legal system's 
extension and penetration goes beyond the scope of existing political sover-
eignty. Law's jurisdiction extends beyond state borders to non-state actors, 
thus, echoing earlier historical understandings of the "law of nations."86 
Under the global rule of law regime, political controversies are plausibly 
adjudicated by faraway third party judiciaries. These political circum-
stances, where courts operate on their own and lack other effective global 
mechanisms, highlight the singularly constructive potential of the law. 
In its rhetorical function, the language of justice is mediating, building 
upon international adjudicative processes to help manage and legitimate 
international conflict. Indeed, the expanded humanitarian regime contem-
plates both the expression and enforcement of norms. This potential for 
judicial enforcement gives the new law norms a sense of reality. The cur-
rent paradigm shift enables a move away from a purely political discourse 
of state interests vindicable in collective exercises of self-determination, to 
legalist rhetoric of rights vindicable in courts of law.87 Juridical processes 
amenable to resolution convert matters of policy into matters of law.88 The 
new international legalism's regular justificatory processes offer the poten-
tial for rationalizing international policymaking.89 Structured processes of 
justification create a sense of a global order. 
Humanitarian norms constitute the emerging global order and serve a 
primarily discursive function. More and more, a depoliticized legalist lan-
guage of right and wrongs, duties and obligations, is supplanting the domi-
nant political language based on state interests, deliberation, and 
consensus. An expanded humanitarian discourse offers an alternative 
basis for global governance, one in which the notion of rule of law is 
largely discursive and international legalism plays a distinctly constructive 
role.90 Law in transformative periods both enables and constrains political 
power. It enables a redefining and reconceptualizing of the interests at 
stake in international conflict. This is a change from conventional terms 
where security was defined largely in terms of state interests because now 
LATIN AMERICA: A CASE BooK (1975) (explaining that this was particularly true of colo-
nial courts); SHAPIRO supra note 67, at 23. 
85. See SHAPIRO, supra note 67 (providing a comparative analysis of courts). 
86. On globalization generally, see HELD ET AL., supra note 3, at 62-87; TRANSNA· 
TIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES, supra note 59, at 385-89. For historical discussion of the "law 
of nations," see W. BLACKSTONE, Four Commentaries on the Laws of England 67 (1st ed. 
1765-1769); see also HuGo GRonus, DE juRE BELLI AC PAC!S 16 (Francis W. Kelsey 
trans., 1913). 
87. See generally HART, supra note 45; SHKLAR, supra note 45. 
88. The turn to the language of law mediates the rhetoric of pure politics, on the one 
hand, and pure moralism on the other. On this point, see HART, supra note 45 at 
212-22, 225-26; see also HENKIN, supra note 79, at 42-44, 88-90, 93 (2d ed. 1979). 
89. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the ICTY's relation to 
NATO intervention in Kosovo). 
90. Sec Martha Finnemore &: Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change, 52 INT'1. 0RG. 887, 895-96, 901-02, 904 (1998). 
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the new humanitarian rights terminology defines .the meaning of security 
more broadly in terms of the preservation of stability across national lines 
and population permanence. 
C. The Uses of International Criminal Law 
The humanitarian legal regime is well suited for a changing global 
politics, because the language of criminal justice enables the reconceptual-
izing of conflict from the local and national to the global, and responsibil-
ity from the collective to the individual. Through the humanitarian legal 
regime's institutions and processes, a formerly purely local conflict exclu-
sively amenable to domestic management is transformable into a situation 
meriting international attention. The new rule of law reconceives and 
delimits the prevailing principles of state sovereignty and self-determina-
tion in the global order by rendering national and international regulation 
ambiguous. By so doing, the new legalism offers a basis for reconceptual-
izing relevant interests in contemporary politics. 
International criminal law processes appear to play a particularly 
important role in globalization because they enable a degree of reconceptu-
alization of the public and private realms. International criminal law has 
significant constructive potential because international criminal enforce-
ment introduces substantial flexibility into the characterization of conflict 
situations. Further, the expanded enforcement associated with the interna-
tional law of armed conflict enables the transformation of traditional 
understandings of responsibility in the international sphere from the 
national to the international, and from the collective to the individual.91 
Expanded enforcement lends new authority to the recognition of added 
legal personality in the globalizing system.92 This process of piercing the 
veil of state power began at Nuremberg, where the post-World War II Char-
ter went beyond existing international law to reconstruct alternative con-
cepts of international and criminal law jurisdiction. A core change 
emerging from the merger of the laws of war and human rights is the ongo-
ing application of the rules of the regime beyond states. 
As visible in the new international criminal codes, the scope of inter-
national criminal law has been entirely reconceived with extended jurisdic-
tion to regulate the use of force beyond states.93 In this post-Westphalia 
rule of law regime, both state and non-state actors are potential subjects of 
91. See Teitel, supra note 21, at 177. 
92. To some extent, this notion of "new" personality is in fact a reversion to an ear-
lier understanding of the subjects of international law of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was a more comprehensive 
view of the scope of the "law of nations." See BLACKSTONE, supra note 86, at 66-67 
(discussing the then application of international law to individuals). 
93. See ICC statute, supra note 18; Minimum Humanitarian Standards: Analytical 
Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Reso-
lution 1997/21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/87, para. 74 (1998). 
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the new legal system.94 This growing importance of non-state actors in 
globalism is perhaps most evident in the law of human rights because the 
individual is preeminently its subject.95 In this regard, the recently 
expanded humanitarian regime goes beyond the traditional law of war and 
its categorical distinctions of war and peace and combatant and civilian to 
propose a broader view of protected status and personality in the system.96 
Although to some extent international criminal law builds upon 
existing understandings of rule of law in the domestic context, particularly 
in the present political circumstances, the uses and forms of criminal law 
in the international setting are distinguishable from those of their domestic 
counterpart. Law does not have a unitary logic. The new international 
legalism has been heralded as a form of transformative jurisprudence with 
the ambitious aim of laying the foundation for global society in the absence 
of predicate political consensus or accountability. In the new humanitari-
anism, law guides the definition of a transforming global rule of law, and 
thus serves a mediating function.97 The new humanitarianism's primary 
role is to offer a coherent discourse that rationalizes the dimensions of 
current foreign policy and supports the international judicial regime's 
move from its historical guardianship of nationalist politics to its contem-
porary guardianship of a globalizing politics. 
Ill. The Effects of the Merger of Two Legal Regimes 
A Globalizing the Law of War 
Parts I and II discuss the constitutive aspects of the new humanitarian-
ism, particularly the dimensions of its potential applicability to foreign 
affairs. This section examines the ramifications of the extended humanita-
rian regime on international law. The newly entrenched humanitarian 
regime is an odd hybrid of two previously autonomous legal regimes: the 
law of war and the law of human rights. Their merger has significant 
ramifications for both regimes, as well as for the international legal system 
as a whole. The awkward fit between the law of war and the international 
human rights regime exposes the tension and incoherence in both regimes. 
Their merger, particularly seen in the expansion of humanitarian dis-
course, has numerous effects that alter international law's process of law-
making, structure, subject, and values. 
94. See Regina v. Bartle, 2 W.L.R 827 (H.L. 1999) reprinted in 2 All E.R.97 (1999) 
and 38 l.L.M. 581, 644 (1999) (discussing the evolution of the concept of individual 
responsibility under international law). 
95. See MICHAEL lGNAT!EFF ET AL, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 63-98, 
109-13, 166-67 (AMY GUTTMAN ed., 2001) (discussing the individual's place in human 
rights law); see generally McDOUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 4; FRANCK, supra note 34. 
96. See Velasquez Rodriguez, Case 7920, Ser. C., No. 4, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 35, OEA/ 
ser. L/V/Ill.19 doc. 13 (1988); reprinted in 28 l.L.M. 291 (1989), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. 
C) No. 4 (1988); supra note 17 and accompanying text Uudgment of July 29, 1988). 
97. For a discussion of law's role in this process of global political transition and the 
constructive force of international humanitarian law as incorporated in national crimi-
nal adjudications, see Teitel, supra note 32, at 20-21, 33-34; see also SHKLAR, supra note 
45 at 130. 
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At the same time it extends the humanitarian regime, the attempted 
merger poses a threat to the continued existence of an independent inter-
national human rights discourse. Indeed, as is elaborated below, the dis-
placement of the established human rights vocabulary by that of the law of 
war goes to the very heart of the meaning of "human rights." 
The merger of these two regulatory schemes complicates the concept 
of protected status as well as the related understandings of subjectivity and 
personality in international law. First, consider the extent to which the law 
of war limits state action in periods of conflict98 and human rights law 
limits state behavior in periods of peace.99 Historically, the law of war had 
an internal perspective because it was understood to involve states consen-
sually agreeing to constrain themselves by setting the bounds of permissi-
ble conflict. In contrast, the law of human rights had an external 
perspective, as persons were protected independently from their nation-
state, potentially altogether independent of state action. 100 At the juncture 
of these two regimes, emerges a dichotomous constitutional self. 
Humanitarian law's expansion is generally regarded as a humanizing 
and progressive step,101 because the expanded regime extends the protec-
tions of the law of war beyond the conditions of international armed con-
flict102 to citizens in peacetime.103 Whereas, under the law of war the 
parameters of normative protection are themselves defined by the character 
of the conflict;104 in human rights law the relevant protected status is 
accorded on other bases.105 However, the historical law of war had given 
rise to an apparent perversity in international law; a gap whereby non-
nationals obtained greater protection than nationals under international 
law.106 After all, historically the law of war protected so-called "enemy" 
aliens in conditions of international armed conflict.107 
The expanded humanitarian law reconciles this contradiction. In the 
globalized humanitarian regime, contracting states no longer have monop-
olistic power over the protection of their citizens' rights. This expansion in 
the scope and subject of humanitarian law has progressive normative con-
98. See supra note 23. 
99. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
100. See Advisory Opinion on the Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the 
American Convention on Human Rights, arts. 74 & 75, CC-2/82, Inter-Am. CER, Series A, 
No. 2, para. 30 (982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 37 (1983). 
101. See Meron, supra note 4. 
102. Those protected included noncombatants in situations of armed conflict. See 
WAR CRIMES, supra note 4. 
103. See, e.g., Meron, supra note 4; HELSINKI WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BosNIA-HERZEGO-
VINA 1-2 (1992). 
104. See Geneva Conventions, supra notes 23 and 73. 
105. On human rights theory, see THEORIES OF RIGHTS Qeremy Waldron ed., 1984); 
Maurice Cranston, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS (Ellan Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1973); Yoram 
Dinstein, Human Rights in Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law, in HuMAN 
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 345, 347 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984). 
106. See Geneva Convention, supra note 23 (discussing treatment of combatants); 
Dinstein, supra note 105, at 345, 347. 
107. See WAR CRIMES, supra note 4. 
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sequences because extending human rights beyond nationality is an impor-
tant move away from status. Yet, as is elaborated below, the gain is modest 
because even under the new global rule of law the relevant ascriptive status 
remains complicated, beyond nationality to subnational and transnational 
status. Therefore, the central normative work of the expanded humanita-
rian regime is to redefine the relevant norms, namely as is appropriate to 
the globalizing order, protecting against violations of the laws of war and 
human rights on the basis of transnational "humanity" status. 108 
In this regard, the expanded humanitarian regime has normative 
dimensions aimed at strengthening international rule of law. While the 
present expansion of humanitarian law appears to be a progressive step in 
the direction of a global order, 109 as currently conceived the new rule of 
law is ambivalent. Nevertheless, it might be best understood as a globaliz-
ing of the law of war. As discussed above, post-Cold War democratization 
and other political transitions followed by not fully consolidated demo-
cratic institutionalization have resulted in diminished national sovereignty 
and heightened potential for political violence. 1 to Thus, the emergent reg-
ulative regime is largely directed at managing systemic political 
violence.LL l 
B. The New Human Security Rights 
In the present political circumstances, while the humanitarian law 
scheme is centered upon the animating value of "humanity," it is protected 
largely in a negative sense. 112 In this regard, the new "humanitarian" 
108. See, e.g., ICC Statute supra note 18, at art. 7(1), defining a "crime against human-
ity'' and providing jurisdiction irrespective of nature of the conflict. ynder the Rome 
Charter, the "crime against humanity" means inhumane acts "committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowl-
edge of the attack." One of the inhumane acts is "persecution" which is defined as "the 
intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law 
by reason of the identity of group or collectivity." Id. at art. 7(2)(g). According to the 
Charter of the current' ad hoc Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "crimes against 
humanity refer to inhumane acts of a very serious nature ... committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, 
ethnic, racial or religious grounds. In the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, such inhu-
mane acts have taken the form of so-called ethnic cleansing. See ICTY Statute, supra 
note 23, at 1173 art. 48; see also Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against 
Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 CoLuM.]. TRANSNAT'L L. 787 (1999); Ruti Teitel, 
The Universal and the Particular in International Criminal]ustice, 30 CoLUM. HuM. RTS. L. 
REV. 285 (1999). See generally GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL jUSTICE (2000). 
109. See, e.g., SASSEN, supra note 8; HELD ET AL., supra note 3 (noting among other 
things, that there is a debate about whether globalization as an analytical construct 
delivers any added value in the search for a coherent understanding of the historical 
forces shaping the socio-political realties of everyday life). 
llO. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. To illustrate, these political conditions 
were particularly evident in the Balkans. See generally jow1n, supra note 6 (discussing 
the character, development, extinction, and legacy of the Leninist phenomenon). 
ll l. On globalization as a regime of military governance, see generally HELD ET AL., 
supra note 3, at 87 -149. 
112. On the notion of humanitarian rights as the basis of "human security," see FEN 
OSLER HAMPSON ET AL., MADNESS IN THE MULTITUDE: HUMAN SECURITY AND WORLD DISOR-
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regime is paradoxical because although it implies greater enforcement of 
rights, the relevant "rights" are limited to those of the most urgent nature, 
namely those that protect personal integrity from extreme persecution and 
extermination. 113 In some regard, the instant humanitarian rights are. so 
unsubstantial that it seems incoherent to conceive of them as "rights" at all 
because they are the minimum personal security rights associated with the 
rule of law. To whatever extent, the emergent humanitarianism is the guar-
antee of "liberalism" in the new global order. It is a "liberalism of fear," a 
global spin on the night watchman state.11 4 
Although framed in the language of individual rights, the law of 
humanity does not necessarily offer an affirmative understanding of "uni-
versal" human rights. Instead, the new humanitarian regime protects 
"humanity,'' in terms of the "peoples" that make up global humanity.115 
While the hybridized regime is nominally in the language of individual 
human rights, the particular rights protected such as those regarding "per-
secution" and "ethnic cleansing" are peculiarly and impliedly rights predi-
cated on the collective. 116 This is the peculiar relevance of the 
humanitarian regime in the present transition to globalization. The emer-
gent legal regime grounds "humanity" rights not on nationality or universal 
moral notions, but instead upon a shared rule of law baseline represented 
by the historical law of war. 117 
C. A New Minorities Regime 
Further as is explicated above, while the "rights" defined in the new 
humanitarian law are individual rights of a group character, they are also 
linked to territorial stability.118 The expanded humanitarian regime 
reaches beyond the longstanding international legal regulation of state sov-
DER 17 -18 (2002). On humanitarianism's protections, see generally jean S. Pictet, Red 
Cross Principles, ICRC, Geneva, 1956, 14-31, also available at www.icrc.org. 
113. See ICC Statute, supra note 18, at arts. 5-8. 
114. For a political theory of rights based on freedom from fear, seejudith N. Shklar, 
The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 21 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 
1989) (proposing a nexus exists between political crises and theories of justice). For 
this negative view of humanity as a source of international criminal law, see generally 
STEVEN RATNER &JASON ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: ATROCITIES IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NuREMBURG LEGACY 46-49 (2d ed. 2001). 
115. For historical discussion, see Pictet, supra note 112 at 14-31. See also HANNAH 
ARENDT, EICHMANN INjERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 268 (1994) (discuss-
ing the charge against Eichmann in precisely these terms, in particular, in the account of 
the "destruction of the Jewish people." Arendt strives to explicate how aiming to destroy 
a "people" constitutes an attack on humanity). 
116. Thus, under the rubric of individual rights against "persecution," the humanita-
rian regime impliedly offers broader recognition of "peoples" under international law. 
117. This is evident, in particular, in the evolution of the "crime against humanity." 
For the historical conceptualization, see Nuremberg Charter, art. 6(c) (applying only to 
the persecution during the war); Van Schaack, supra note 108. 
118. The proposed "Rome Standards of the International Criminal Court" defines a 
"crime against humanity" as "persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity 
on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender ... grounds .... " See ICC 
Statute, supra note 18, at art. 7. 
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ereignty to protect the territorial stability of ethnic and other groups.119 
Insofar as the expanded humanitarian regime defines new norms, relating 
to the treatment of "peoples" it destabilizes international law's historic 
nexus between international security with national sovereignty. 120 
However, the scope of transnational rule of law protection is limited to 
the preservative right against the transfer of ethnic collectives from their 
present territory, directed at maintaining population permanence.121 In 
this regard, the emerging doctrine of humanitarian intervention is best 
understood as a principle that limits the existing international system of 
state sovereignty. The regime is a rule of law apt for a concededly more 
interconnected world, particularly due to its proposed limiting of ethnic 
politics on a humanitarian basis, which introduces a normative ceiling on 
the longstanding political principles of nationalism and self-determination 
guiding the international realm. 
As such, the expanded humanitarian scheme constitutes a minorities 
regime for the global age. 122 Offering an enforceable standard for the pro-
tection of persecuted groups, the contemporary humanitarian scheme lim-
its national jurisdiction and extends international jurisdiction beyond its 
traditional scope. In the emergent minorities scheme, the new gravamen of 
119. For the definition of "ethnic cleansing," see Final Report of the Commission of 
Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), Annex,, U.N. Doc. 
S/1994/674 at 33 [hereinafter Annex, Final E.eport] (defining "ethnic cleansing" as a 
purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and 
terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from 
certain geographic areas"). 
120. See supra notes 4 and 8. However, see the U.N. CHARTER, art. SS, referring to the 
rights of "self-determination of peoples." 
121. On population permanence and the definition of the state, see IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW S69-7S (Sth ed. 1998). 
122. Historically, the "minority treaties" were the conventional law that provided 
international law protection of national minorities. In the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, particularly following the first World War, countries entered into so-
called minority treaties that usually protected ethnic minorities within states. See, e.g., 
Minority Schools in Albania, 193S P.C.l.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64. 
In the post-World War II statutes, the definition of the protective group or collective 
has expanded beyond nationality-to race and religion. See, e.g., International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, December 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered 
into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]; Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 
12, 1951). Article 1 of the ICESCR guarantees the rights of "all peoples," but does not 
mention ethnicity per se as a protected class. Article 2 notes that "race, color, religion 
... [or] national or social origin" are protected statuses. See also ICC Statute, supra note 
18, at art. 7(1)(h) (defining "persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender ... or other grounds" as a 
crime against humanity). 
Recent codifications responding to contemporary ethnic conflicts further expand the 
definition of the protected "group." See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. CTR-96-4-T, 
Judgment, Sept. 2, 1998, reprinted in 37 l.l.M. 1399 (1998) (applying the Genocide 
Convention Article 2 to all "stable and permanent" groups); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, 
Case No. ICTR-9S-l-T, Judgment, 9[98 (1999). For discussion of these precedents see 
William A. Schabas, Groups Protected by the Genocide Convention: Conflicting Interpreta-
tions from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 6 ILSA]. INT'L & COMP. l. 37S 
(2000). 
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"international" jurisdiction protects territorial borders on the basis of 
nationality as well as ethnicity and related bases. 123 In this new regime, 
the historical rule of law norm in the international sphere, namely the pro-
tection of national sovereignty within the borders of the nation-state, is 
complemented by an alternative norm that links territorial protection with 
the rights of "peoples." Premising international jurisdiction on ethnicity 
implies the extension of preservative rights under international law beyond 
their preexisting nexus with nationality in two ways. 
First, and perhaps the most evident, international law is being 
extended beyond the nation-state borders. The second, less transparent 
dimension goes to the substantive right at stake, namely under what cir-
cumstances and basis international protection is accorded.124 While "peo-
ples" have not yet acquired full personality under international law, the 
new humanitarian regime to some extent implicitly recognizes their pro-
tected status under the law.125 
However, the emphasis on ethnicity has significant consequences. 
Legalists argue that the law can be used to depoliticize ethnicity through 
the use of the criminal law and its attribution of individual responsibility 
for ethnic-based persecution. 126 However, their argument is flawed insofar 
as the offenses that are often at issue, such as massive persecution, tend to 
involve systemic policy. These policies of systematic persecution involve a 
mix of individual and collective responsibility. Further, when the law aims 
to deter future persecution it nevertheless creates the risk that representa-
tion of ethnic persecution, albeit in the juridical context, may further 
ethnicize the political discourse. 127 
The present reversion to international treaties that sound in minori-
ties' regimes illuminates the extent to which the new international law is 
·analogous to and associated with the juridical conditions of the early twen-
tieth century multinational regime. The twentieth century dramatically 
displayed the failure of the minorities' regime associated with multina-
tional empires. Nevertheless, a form of minorities' regime is occurring in 
globalization's analogous and unstable political conditions. 128 The new 
123. See generally Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A 
Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM.]. lNT'L. L. 414 ( 1998) (discuss-
ing "indigenous peoples"); Schabas, supra note 122. 
124. This is evident in the definition of "ethnic cleansing" under international law. 
See Annex, Final Report, supra note 119, at 33 (defining "ethnic cleansing" as a pur-
poseful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-
inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from cer-
tain geographic areas). See ICTY Statute, supra note 23, at art. 48; see also Van Schaack, 
supra note 108; Teitel, supra note 21. 
125. For a philosophical discussion, see generally RAWLS, supra note 35. 
126. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on jurisdiction, para. 12 (Oct. 9, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-
e.htm (hearing on Rule 61); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 121, at 183-89. 
127. See Teitel, supra note 21 (discussing the ICTY and proposing that the proceed-
ings "fall short because they cannot offer the thick form of reconciliation necessary for 
reconstructing a community inhabited by citizens." Id. at 189). 
128. For a more comprehensive argument for empire theory, see MICHAEL HARDT &: 
ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000) (arguing that sovereignty has taken a new form, com-
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humanitarian regime contemplates a tiered approach to the rule of law 
whereby states are initially responsible for the protection of their minori-
ties; however, the regime also lays a basis for international intervention 
should the states' national mechanisms fail. International intervention is 
deemed preferable to destabilizing ethnic secession, or transnational inter-
vention. However, where human rights standards are linked to the humani-
tarian regime-in particular to its distinctive enforcement mechanisms-
the hybrid legal system potentially threatens the independent normative 
status of human rights law. Indeed, the risk of normative conflict is evi-
dent in the mixed regime's extension of the bases for humanitarian inter-
vention.129 The next Part illustrates some of the potential for normative 
conflict and discusses the full policy implications of changes that are not 
yet fully transparent. 130 
IV. Foreign Policymaking in the Shadow of the Law 
This Part illustrates the context for foreign policymaking in the 
shadow of the law by exploring t.he recent humanitarian dilemmas in the 
Balkans and Rwanda. An examination of these scenarios highlights the 
role of humanitarian law and some of the problems created by its indeter-
minacy and risks of politicization. As a rule of law for periods of political 
change, the new regime both constrains and enables state power in addi-
tion to providing a basis for unilateral state military intervention. 
A. Rethinking Security 
The new international legalism has a normative impact on global 
politics because the changing rule of law both constrains and enables exer-
cises of state power. The emerging juridical regime transforms the prevail-
ing historical view of international rule of law premised upon the 
protection of national sovereignty and the borders of the nation-state. This 
development seems to challenge state sovereignty since the new humanita-
rian rights contemplate the penetration of conventional state sovereignty 
and territoriality in order to protect persecuted collectives. 131 In the new 
global scheme, violations of ethnic sovereignty are no longer regarded as 
posed of a series of national and super-national orga11isms united under a single logic 
rule, and that the new global form of sovereignty is what they call "empire." It estab-
lishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It 
is a decentralized and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates 
the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers." Id. at xii). 
129. See infra notes 154-72 and accompanying text. 
130. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text. 
131. There is an expanding literature on humanitarian intervention. See FRANCIS KOFI 
ABIEW, THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
(1999); GRAY, supra note 72, at 24-51; SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: 
THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER (1997); BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMEN-
TAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999); FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTER-
VENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed. 1997); Antonio Cassese, A Follow-
Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio Necessitatis, 10 EuR. ]. INT'L L. 
791 (1999); NATO's Kosovo Intervention, 93 AM.]. INT'L. L. 824, 824-60 (1999); W. 
Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive Pro-
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domestic matters, but as matters of consequence for the international 
community. 
However, the humanitarian scheme creates divergent and complex 
conflicts for state sovereignty because the regime both constrains and 
enables state power. The new legalism offers an ongoing justificatory 
apparatus for unilateral and multilateral international intervention. As 
such the new regime, while explicitly oriented towards peace and stability, 
also predicates norms that offer new bases for the exercise of state power 
and military intervention based on humanitarian grounds. These legal 
developments signal a marked change in the meaning of security in the 
international realm. 
While human rights are often juxtaposed against state security inter-
ests, 132 under the new humanitarian scheme that juxtaposition presents a 
complex tension. The new humanitarianism redefines the meaning of 
international security by substituting the longstanding understanding of 
security as protection of state borders with a transformed construction 
grounded in the discourse of human rights. Under the new humanitarian 
scheme, preservative human rights operate as proxies for national borders 
in a globalizing politics. The humanitarian rights at stake are "preserva-
tive" in two senses. First, these rights protect against persecution and eth-
nic cleansing in order to preserve a collective's ability to survive. Second, 
these rights promote population permanence and residence in particular 
territories. 133 As such, human rights under the new humanitarian scheme 
constitute set juridical constructs of state borders that redefine the mean-
ing of security in global politics. For instance, a threat to a collective's 
preservative rights may affect the permanence of that population, thus 
endangering peaceful global coexistence. It is precisely this threat that 
would otherwise not be protected under the currently prevailing rule of law 
norm of state self-determination, which might well point instead to ethnic 
secession. The expansion of international jurisdiction aims to stabilize the 
global order by protecting against the persecution and migration of peo-
ples, threats to territorial integrity in surrounding areas arid the balance of 
political power in the global order. Under the new humanitarian regime, 
the protected ethnic and other group-related rights limit the currently pre-
vailing ethos of self-determination as the defining dimension of security in 
the international realm, in so doing redefining and broadening the mean-
ing of stability and security in international law and the global order. 
As previously discussed, the political effect of the humanitarian 
regime's legal developments is to protect threshold preservative rights. The 
new humanitarianism allows for a rethinking of the public and private by 
regulating internal state conflicts. However, the extent to which it does so 
is highly limited because the newly expanded humanitarian regime takes 
cess: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 11 EuR.]. INT'L L. 3 (2000). For 
applications and discussion, see infra Part IV(B). 
132. For one such argument about the contemporary conflict see Michael lgnatieff, Is 
the Human Rights Era Ending?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at A25. 
133. See ICC Statute, supra note 18, at art. 5. 
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the present territorial status quo as a given. Moreover, under the humani-
tarian regime the question of how economic security relates to military and 
territorial security is not contestable;134 instead, the apparent role of the 
new rule of law is to sustain the status quo, reinforcing the present territo-
rial balance of global politics, while facilitating globalization processes. 135 
The emergence of the instant juridical regime, discussed here in contempo-
rary globalizing conditions involving extensive migration of capital rights, 
reflects that these expectations do not abide in regard to the movement of 
peoples. 136 just the reverse, the juridical developments discussed here are 
best understood, not as articulations of ideal human rights norms, but 
rather as provisional measures simply aimed at managing the present situa-
tion of heightened disorder associated with contemporary globalizing polit-
ics in the international realm. 
B. From the Borders of the State to those of the Collective 
The above understanding of the implications of the current humanita-
rian rule of law also resonates in some liberal political theorizing, which 
reflects uncharacteristically chastened expectations. For example, in The 
Law of Peoples john Rawls offers a plausible standard for global rule of law 
by presenting a largely positive account of human rights' role in present 
political realities. 137 In The Law of Peoples, Rawlsian human rights operate 
as a preservative norm, a floor that functions largely to maintain the pre-
vailing values and structure of present international relations. 138 Princi-
ples of national sovereignty and self-determination in the international 
realm continue to occupy a central role. 139 Also, the uses of "human 
rights" as the basis for international rule of law are strictly limited to justi-
fying humanitarian intervention as a response to "expansionist" policies-
nevertheless the Rawlsian emendation is to conceive of the contemporary 
understanding of what constitutes "expansionism" to extend within 
national borders. 140 Here again as previously discussed, 141 a contempo-
rary version of the historical minorities regimes emerges in the "law of peo-
ples. "142 Thus, the relevant protected rights are "peoples" rights-namely 
extensions of collective rights to self-determination beyond nationality to 
134. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 111 (exhorting globalization as an opportunity for 
deliberation over social justice). 
135. Rights against persecution and ethnic clea·nsing are "group rights" and implicate 
property rights, see generally RAwLs supra note 35. 
136. Indeed, this understanding builds on traditional definitions of the state in terms 
of permanence of populations. See HELD ET AL., supra note 3. 
137. See RAwLs, supra note 35, at 25-30 (proposing a view of justice in the interna-
tional order conceived in terms of "peoples" rather than "states"). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. (espousing traditional statist views and comparing it to his theory of the "law 
of peoples"). 
140. See id. at 37-38. 
141. See supra Part Ill, note 126. 
142. For discussion of the interwar minorities' regime, see supra note 35 and accom-
panying text. 
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other ascriptive bases, such as ethnicity. 143 Protection of these rights is 
used to justify international intervention. 144 
Rawl's positive approach to global rule of law, which draws from pre-
sent political practices, is a far cry from more aspirational cosmopolitan 
schemes. 145 Although both schemes conceive contemporary human rights 
in terms of bases that are independent of exclusive state sovereignty, cos-
mopolitan schemes go much farther in conceptualizing an affirmative con-
stitutive role of human rights operating independent of bases analogous to 
the principles of state sovereignty and nationality.146 
C. Illustrations 
This Article has discussed the ways in which the present understand-
ing of international rule of law is now undergoing a paradigm shift. This 
section addresses how these changes are beginning to influence foreign 
policy discourse, 14 7 evincing the paradigm shift in the conception of rule 
of law. Recent foreign policy deliberations reflect varying assumptions 
about the meaning of international rule of law. The statist view is associ-
ated with adherence to longstanding understandings of state sovereignty 
through the maintenance of international order through the principle of 
geopolitical stability. In contrast, the new humanitarian standards treat 
the invocation of the principle of state sovereignty as a rationalization for 
lawlessness and consider rule of law to depend on the potential of greater 
international intervention. 148 On one hand, humanitarian intervention 
could be a slippery slope because it threatens the stability of the interna-
tional order. On the other hand, such intervention is crucial to maintain-
ing rule of law in the international realm. These competing views of rule of 
law, apparently contradictory and irreconcilable, represent the currently 
shifting paradigm. 
143. See ICC Statute, supra note 18, at arts. 5-8. 
144. See supra note 35. 
145. For an explanation of what cosmopolitan law entails, see HELD ET AL, supra note 
3, at 70-74 (explaining that cosmopolitan law refers to "those elements of law-albeit 
created by states-which create powers and constraints, and rights and duties, which 
transcend the claims of nation-states ·and which have far-reaching national conse-
quences." These elements are meant to define and protect basic human rights values 
that no political agent should in principle be able to cross). Id. at 70. The cosmopolitan 
project attempts to specify the principles and the institutional arrangements for making 
sites and forms of power, which presently operate beyond the scope of democratic con-
trol. Id. at 449-50. For examples of the cosmopolitan approach, see CHARLES R. BEITZ, 
POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1999) (advocating a cosmopolitan 
approach); STANLEY HOFFMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVEN-
TION (1996);Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 751 (1992). See generally CHARLOTTE BRETHERTON &: GEOFFREY PON-
TON, GLOBAL POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION (1996). 
146. Such as ethnicity, race or religion. See Kingsbury, supra note 123; Schabas, supra 
note 122. 
14 7. For a discussion of the "legalist" paradigm in foreign relations, see WALZER, supra 
note 70, at 58-62. 
148. See generally BEITZ, supra note 145. 
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International deliberations concerning the human rights crises in the 
former Yugoslavia and Africa illustrate the tragic choices that accompany 
rule of law dilemmas. The events in Bosnia and Rwanda were instances of 
international inaction, despite apparently universally accepted imperatives 
against gross and systematic rights violations, and thus were evident fail-
ures of the international legal order. 149 In contrast, although lacking full 
legality due to the absence of a United Nations mandate, humanitarian 
actions taken in Kosovo reflected a newly emerging legitimacy. 1so The gap 
between what traditionally constituted legality in the international legal 
system, namely protection of national sovereignty and a new understand-
ing of legitimacy, signals the contradictions in the prevailing meaning of 
rule of law in the international realm. 
Recent deliberations by the international community over humanita-
rian intervention in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo reflect the expanded role 
of international law in policy discourse. The relevant policy debates 
regarding these crises were informed by changing assumptions about the 
meaning of international rule of law. The crises brought home the extent 
to which the preexisting international system was inapt to handle post-
Cold War dilemmas by underscoring the lack of an international military 
or other alternative enforcement mechanisms and spurring the present 
momentum for change in the international legal regime in light of the cur-
rent shift in global power relations. 1s1 
The dilemmas, chiefly in the Balkans, over humanitarian intervention 
reflect the contestation over and transformation of the meaning of interna-
tional rule oflaw. 1 s2 While in the old "Westphalian" political order, rule of 
law in international affairs was defined largely in terms of state interests in 
149. See Rwanda Report, supra note 19; Implications of International Response to 
Events in Rwanda, Kosovo Examined by Secretary-General, in Address to General Assembly, 
U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th mtg., reprinted in U.N. Press Release GA/9595 (1999) (pro-
viding highlights of the Secretary-General's opening address to the General Assembly). 
In his opening address, Secretary-General Kofi Annan was notably among those calling 
for humanitarian intervention-statements giving rise to the so-called Annan Doctrine. 
See, e.g., A GLOBAL AGENDA: ISSUES BEFORE THE 55TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS 1 Qohn Tessitore & Susan Woolfson eds., 2000); Secretary-General Presents His 
Annual Report to the General Assembly, reprinted in U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136 GA/ 
9596 (1999); Secretary-General Calls For Renewed Commitment in New Century to Protect 
Rights of Man, Woman, Child- Regardless of Ethnic, National Belonging, reprinted in U.N. 
Press Release SG/SM/6949 HR/CN/898 (1999); Secretary-General Says Renewal of Effec-
tiveness and Relevance of the Security Council Must be Cornerstone of Efforts to Promote 
International Peace in Next Century, reprinted in U.N. Press Release SG/SM/6997 (1999). 
150. See supra note 6; Kosovo Report, supra note 28, at 186; see also Statement on the 
Situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, issued by the Movement of Non-Aligned 
Countries, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1999/451 (1999) (arguing that 
the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and, thus, 
for authorizing the use of force in a humanitarian intervention rests with the U.N. Secur-
ity Council). 
151. This awareness has been underscored post-September 11. 
152. Report of the Secretary-General to Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1999/957, at 7 (1999) [hereinafter Secretary-
General's Report]. 
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self-determination, 153 in contemporary transforming politics the protec-
tion of this norm no longer adequately comprehends the sense of adher-
ence to global rule of law. To the contrary, under the new regime, the 
primary basis of illegality under the prior system, namely penetrating 
national sovereignty, may well be treated as justified intervention. 154 
Indeed, recent human rights crises illuminate the changing norm 
regarding the meaning of international rule of law. 155 Under the new 
humanitarian regime, the relevant policy questions run the gamut from 
when humanitarian intervention may be justified to when it might be 
required-law itself is deemed to define the peace. Justice's aim transcends 
the backward looking to do forward-looking work. To illustrate, the inter-
national adjudications ongoing in the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia introduced a remarkable aim for international law: 
advancing the aim of "deterrence" of prospective humanitarian tragedies 
through international criminal processes as a way to achieve peace and 
reconciliation of ethnic conflict in the international realm. 156 Standing 
alone, the notion that international law is the way to peace is not new-
indeed this was a traditional belief common to the nineteenth century. 157 
However, what is new is the notion that law itself can define what consti-
tutes peace and stability internationally, and further that it could somehow 
displace politics to resolve international conflict.158 The justification for 
applying international criminal law may constitute a facile extension of 
domestic criminal legal rationales of deterrence, 159 yet at the international 
level, the success of these legal mechanisms remains largely unproven. 
Indeed, heinous massacres continued in the Balkans despite ongoing pros-
ecutions at the ad hoc Yugoslavia Tribunal proceedings. 160 Similar doubts 
persist about the effects of legal responses relating to the Rwandan geno-
cide.161 These instances raise doubts about any direct nexus regarding 
153. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2; WALZER, supra note 70. 
154. See infra notes 166-170 and accompanying text. 
155. See id. 
156. See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993). 
157. See SHKLAR, supra note 45, at 129 (noting that in the nineteenth century "[i]t was 
urged not only that international law was a means to peace, but that it was the only road 
to that end. All other forms of political action not only could be neglected; they were 
regarded as undesirable"). See TucK, supra note 75; Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual 
Peace: A Philosophical Sketch in KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS 105 (Hans Reiss ed., H. B. 
Nisbet trans., 1977). 
158. ICC Statute, supra note 18, at Preamble. 
159. See Teitel supra note 47, at 33-39, 49-51. Here the analogy to domestic law is 
thin. The role of law is not unitary, and its domestic functions are differentiable from its 
international role. 
160. This was most glaring at the time of the Srebrenica massacre. See Teitel, supra 
note 21, at 178; see also Security Council Strongly Condemns Humanitarian Law Violations 
by Bosnian Serbs, Paramilitary Forces; Cites Summary Executions, Mass Expulsions, 
reprinted in U.N. Press Release SC/6149 (1995) available at http://www.un.org/News/ 
Press/ docs/ 1995/ l 995122 l.sc6 l 49.html; Security Council Condemns Continued Grave 
Human Rights Violations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, reprinted in U.N. Press 
Release SC/6122/Rev. 1 * (1995), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 
1995/l 995l109.sc6122.rl.html. 
161. See, e.g., Rwanda Report, supra note 19. 
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international criminal justice and the advancement of global rule of law. 
Finally, there are less transparent dimensions of the new humanita-
rian discourse, particularly how the new rule of law constitutes both a con-
straint and an expansion of the exercise of power and, in turn, 
international relations. The legal developments described above ultimately 
point to a marked expansion of the law of conflict. 162 Whereas historically 
international humanitarian law was limited to rationalizing the use of force 
after the fact, 16 3 the current expanded regime would come in earlier and 
potentially play a broader role in policy deliberations. While the new inter-
national rule of law does not necessarily reflect a political consensus on 
humanitarian intervention, the emergent legal regime does lay the basis for 
its potential uses. The new humanitarian regime manifestly expands upon 
the historical bases for humanitarian intervention, namely the protection 
of state self-determination,16 4 to include other bases such as the protection 
of internal minorities. 165 This change subtly shifts the political debate 
regarding humanitarian rights cases, thus allowing for a growing interven-
tionism. Perhaps, this is to be expected in a globalizing and thus more 
interconnected international order. 
This development was evident on the international relations road from 
Bosnia to Kosovo. In a report on recent humanitarian crises, United 
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed that human rights abuses, 
such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and threats of genocide, con-
stitute legitimate justifications for Security Council intervention under 
Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. Moreover, he asserted that scope 
is a leading factor on which to predicate a recommendation of intervention 
based on breaches of the new humanitarian law.166 Therefore the broader 
the bases for adjudicating humanitarian law, the broader the bases for mili-
tary intervention-one justifies the other. The exploding bullet of the new 
humanitarian regime is that it ostensibly offers a legal and nonviolent 
means to uphold the rule of law while also laying a basis for justifying 
potential military intervention, should the political will for such action 
emerge. The legalization of NATO intervention in Kosovo illustrates the 
potential power of the new regime, 167 because there policymaking reflected 
clashing views of rule of law and thus what may well be perceptibly illegal, 
was nevertheless legitimate in the public eye. 16 8 
162. See supra note 131. 
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SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3930th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998), U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 
33937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998); see generally Henkin, supra note 64. 
168. The ultimate legitimacy of the NATO intervention is still a matter of substantial 
controversy. See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention 
in Kosovo, 93 AM.]. lNT'L L. 834 (1999) (arguing the intervention's "legality remains 
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The question arises as to what extent the potential for humanitarian 
intervention comes into conflict with the core international law commit-
ment against the use of force. Humanitarian intervention is generally con-
sidered to pose a challenge to the United Nations' Charter's commitment to 
state sovereignty, 169 as recognized by the conclusions of the Independent 
Commission on Kosovo's finding that NATO intervention was "illegal yet 
legitimate."170 However, as the above discussion suggests the global rule of 
law comprehends multiple values. The fact that the same norms can pull 
in potentially conflicting directions underscores the indeterminacy and 
extent to which the global rule of law, as it is currently framed, constitutes 
a highly manipulable regime that lends itself to politicization. In this 
regard, reliance on an international judiciary and discourse of justice 
reflects a concern for the appearance of principled decision-making 
processes in foreign affairs. The new humanitarianism advances the con-
struction of a normative international discourse. Understood in discursive 
terms, the enhancement of international legalism expresses the sense that 
there is a regulation of the international realm, a legitimate international 
law, and an international community with shared threshold norms. 
Conclusion 
The new humanitarianism walks a thin line. The emerging legal sys-
tem is intended to advance the goal of rationalizing foreign policy decision-
making and to assist in the legitimization of the new globalizing order. 
However, the enterprise has troubling ramifications that are not readily 
transparent. To a large extent, the humanitarian regime aims to ensure 
minimal preservative rights that rationalize the protection of the territorial 
status quo in contemporary foreign affairs. Beyond the role of the law as 
constraint, the proposed regime would also authorize the expansion of the 
bases for military intervention beyond its historical goal of protecting 
national sovereignty to the broader goal of protecting collectives in ways 
that are likely to become politicized. Finally, the emergence of an 
expanded humanitarian regime threatens to erode the human rights dis-
course and value system, which was formerly an independent perspective 
that allowed for normative critique of the global rule of law in prevailing 
political realities. 
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